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Rejoinder
Robert E. Kass
In writing my essay I presumed I was voicing,
with a few novel nuances, a nearly universal attitude
among contemporary statistical practitioners—at
least among those who had wrestled with the incom-
patibility of Bayesian and frequentist logic. Then
David Madigan collected commentaries from sev-
eral thoughtful and accomplished statisticians. Not
only do I know Andrew Gelman, Steve Goodman,
Hal Stern and Rob McCulloch, and respect them
deeply, but I would have been inclined to imagine I
had been speaking for them successfully. Their re-
marks shook me from my complacency. While they
generally agreed with much of what I had to say,
there were several points that would clearly benefit
from additional clarification and discussion, includ-
ing the role of subjectivity in Bayesian inference, the
approximate alignment of our theoretical and real
worlds, and the utility of p-values. Here I will ignore
these specific disagreements and comment further
only on the highest-level issues.
We care about our philosophy of statistics, first
and foremost, because statistical inference sheds light
on an important part of human existence, inductive
reasoning, and we want to understand it. Philosoph-
ical perspectives are also supposed to guide behav-
ior, in research and in teaching. My polemics fo-
cused on teaching, highlighting my discomfort with
the use of Figure 3 as the “big picture” of statistical
inference. My sense had been that as a principal de-
scription of statistical thinking, Figure 3 was widely
considered bothersome, but no one had complained
publicly. McCulloch agreed zealously. Gelman and
Stern, however, dissented; both find much continu-
ing use for the notion that statistics is largely about
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reasoning from samples to populations. As a matter
of classroom effectiveness, I am sure that many in-
structors can do a great job of conveying essential
ideas of statistics using Figure 3. My main point,
though, was that introductory courses benefit from
emphasizing the abstraction of statistical models—
their hypothetical, contingent nature—along with
the great utility of this kind of abstraction. As we re-
marked in Brown and Kass (2009), when Box (1979)
said, “All models are wrong, but some are useful,”
he was expressing a quintessentially statistical atti-
tude. Figure 1 seeks to make Box’s sentiment cen-
tral to statistical pedagogy, and I tried to indicate
the way the main idea may be illustrated repeatedly
throughout an elementary course.
Recognizing Box’s apparent influence here, Good-
man then asked whether I was simply restating Box’s
philosophy, and he further prodded me to show how
my own statement of statistical pragmatism could
be consequential.
In his 1976 Fisher Lecture, cited by Goodman,
Box railed against what he called “mathematicity,”
meaning theory developed in isolation from prac-
tice, and he stressed the iterative nature of model
building. The fundamental role of model criticism
based on Fisherian logic was emphasized not only
by Box but also, in several roughly contemporaneous
discussions, by Dempster and by Rubin, and these
presumably influenced Gelman and Stern, who, to-
gether with their colleague Xiao-Li Meng, developed
and studied Bayesian model checking procedures.
Importantly, model criticism plays a prominent role
in Gelman et al. (2004). The aim of my discussion,
however, was somewhat different than what I take
Box to have intended. I understand Box to have said
that estimation should be Bayesian but criticism fre-
quentist, or inspired by frequentist logic. Statistical
pragmatism asserts, more simply and more gener-
ally, that both forms of logic have merit, and either
can be used for any aspect of scientific inference. In
addition, I suggested the commonality of subjunc-
tive statements to help us acknowledge that the big
issues, in practice, are not Bayes versus frequentist
but rather the effects of various modeling assump-
tions, and the likely behavior of procedures.
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Stern noted that the pragmatism I described
“seems to be a fairly evolved state for a statisti-
cian; it seems to require a clear understanding of
the various competing foundational arguments that
have preceded it historically.” I agree. Along with
Goodman, Stern wondered whether such an eclectic
philosophy could influence statistical behavior, es-
pecially when tackling unsolved problems. I would
claim that it does. I admit, however, that I have not
done the substantial work it would take to provide
a satisfactory argument, with compelling examples.
Lacking this, I will try to make do with a brief illus-
tration.
Many experiments in neuroscience apply a fixed
stimulus repeatedly to some neural network and ob-
serve the consequences. A typical example, discussed
by Vu, Yu and Kass (2009), involved the audio re-
play of a short snippet of a natural birdsong while
a single auditory neuron was recorded from a zebra
finch. In such contexts, mutual information is often
used to quantify the strength of the relationship be-
tween stimulus and response. Mutual information
requires the joint time series of stimulus and re-
sponse to be stationary and ergodic, but bird songs
contain many bursts of rapidly varying intensities
with long pauses in between. Thus, a snippet of nat-
ural song appears highly nonstationary. In other ex-
periments, the stimulus is deterministic. Vu et al.
asked whether, in such contexts, estimates of mutual
information become meaningless. If we demand that
there be a well-defined chance mechanism behind ev-
ery stochastic assumption, as the literal interpreta-
tion of Figure 3 suggests, then clearly mutual infor-
mation becomes void for deterministic stimuli; but
so too would any kind of statistical inference in-
volving the joint distribution. The broader notion
emphasized by Figure 1 is that the mathematical
formalism in the stochastic model is an abstraction
whose primary purpose is to represent, in all rele-
vant respects, the variability displayed by the data.
Under this interpretation, stochastic models can be
of use even with deterministic stimuli. Thus, dis-
missal of mutual information on the grounds of in-
adequate chance mechanism is too crude. Instead,
the constraint on time series variability imposed by
stationarity must be considered carefully. Vu et al.
provided more pointed criticism, some new math-
ematical analysis, and a way to salvage the usual
quantitative measures in such settings. Was the phi-
losophy behind Figure 1 necessary to obtain the re-
sults of Vu et al.? No. But as I hope to have indi-
cated, it was helpful in supporting a path we could
follow, and that is all one should ask of founda-
tions.
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